A vulnerable extension
An outdated or abandoned plugin with a known exploit, or a nulled theme with a payload already inside the zip. This is the most common way in, and the least likely thing a generic scanner patches.
Security
Cleaning the payload is the easy part. The job is finding the entry point, so the site does not get reinfected next week.
A hacked WordPress site is rarely hacked once. The visible symptom — a redirect, a blacklist warning, Japanese spam pages in search — is usually the last stage of an intrusion that began with a vulnerable plugin weeks earlier. Scanners remove the file they can see and miss the dropper that recreates it.
I clean from the outside in: snapshot first, inventory every file against a clean source, trace the entry point through access logs and timestamps, then remove payloads from files, database, cron and must-use plugins. Credentials and salts are rotated afterwards, because a stolen session is often how the attacker comes back.
An outdated or abandoned plugin with a known exploit, or a nulled theme with a payload already inside the zip. This is the most common way in, and the least likely thing a generic scanner patches.
An admin password reused from a breach elsewhere, no two-factor, and a login page open to the world. Attackers log in legitimately and leave nothing malicious behind until later.
A previous cleanup removed the visible payload but not the dropper, the malicious cron entry, or the hidden admin that recreates it.
A compromised hosting account, a stolen FTP or SSH key, or a neighbour on shared infrastructure. Cleaning WordPress alone will not hold if the entry point sits above it.
Full snapshot of files and database before anything is deleted. If the cleanup goes wrong, this is the only way back.
Core, plugins and themes compared with clean upstream copies. Unknown files and modified timestamps reviewed, not bulk-deleted.
Access logs, upload timestamps and injected code patterns to find the original vulnerability, not only the latest payload.
Backdoors, droppers, injected JavaScript, spam pages, malicious cron, mu-plugins, and injected rows in options and postmeta.
Salts and keys, every admin password, the database user, FTP/SSH, and any API keys stored in the database.
File permissions, disabled file editing, login protection and WAF rules where available, then a second scan and a Search Console review request.
Almost never. Injected rows are removed surgically and legitimate posts, pages, products and orders are preserved. I verify a sample of content and the database integrity after cleaning.
I clean the site and prepare it for review. Google decides when to lift the warning, and it usually follows within days once the site is verifiably clean. I tell you what to submit and when.
Because the entry point was not closed. Scanners remove known payloads; they rarely find droppers, hidden admins or the vulnerable plugin that let the attacker in. Reinfection means something was missed, not that cleaning cannot work.
Usually not. If the site is actively serving malware to visitors, a short maintenance window is the responsible choice. I will tell you which situation you are in before starting.
Sometimes, but a restore also restores the vulnerability and loses everything created since the backup. I compare both routes and recommend the one that actually holds.
Malware removal
A short diagnosis is free. If the fault is outside this service, you will be told which one applies — or that the site is not worth repairing.
Or email hello@wordpressfixe.com — first reply within 1 business day.